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Abstract
In a recent paper de Alfaro, Henzinger and Majumdar [8] observed that discounting successive
payments, the procedure that is employed in the classical stochastic game theory since the seminal
paper of Shapley [16], is also pertinent in the context of much more recent theory of stochastic
parity games [7,6,5] which were proposed as a tool for veriﬁcation of probabilistic systems.
We show that, surprisingly perhaps, the particular discounting used in [8] is in fact very close to
the original ideas of Shapley. This observation allows to realize that the speciﬁc discounting of [8]
suﬀers in fact from some needless restrictions. We advocate that dropping the constraints imposed
in [8] leads to a more general and elegant theory that includes parity and mean payoﬀ games as
particular limit cases.
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1 Stochastic Games
The proper framework for our presentation are stochastic games introduced
by Shapley [16].
Such games are played by two players 4 : the player 0 and the player 1. We
1 This research was supported by European Research Training Network: Games and Au-
tomata for Synthesis and Validation
2 Email: hugo@liafa.jussieu.fr
3 Email: zielonka@liafa.jussieu.fr
4 We consider here exclusively two players’ zero sum games even if some deﬁnitions can
obviously be stated in the broader framework of many players non zero sum games.
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are given a ﬁnite set 5 of states S, for each state s ∈ S we have two ﬁnite sets
of actions : A(s) – the actions of player 0 and B(s) the set of actions of player
1. If the system is at the state s ∈ S both players choose simultaneously and
independently actions a ∈ A(s) and b ∈ B(s) respectively and the system goes
to a new state s′ with the probability p(s′ | s, a, b) that, as we can see, depends
on the current state and the chosen actions. We suppose that the conditional
probabilities are correctly and consistently deﬁned, i.e., 0 ≤ p(s′ | s, a, b) ≤ 1
and
∑
s′∈S p(s
′ | s, a, b) = 1.
A play in such a game is an inﬁnite sequence
p = (s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), (s2, a2, b2), . . .
of triples (si, ai, bi) belonging to the set
T = {(s, a, b) | s ∈ S and a ∈ A(s), b ∈ B(s) }
whose elements will be called transitions. Intuitively, the play p describes the
sequence of the visited states and the actions chosen by both players at each
stage i of the game.
A payoﬀ mapping u maps each possible play p to a real number u(p) —
the payment received by player 0 from player 1 resulting from the play p. The
obvious aim of 0 is to play in a way that maximizes his gain while player 1
tries to minimize his loss. Both players use strategies, that indicate how they
should play at each stage of a game, i.e., which available action will be chosen.
In general the choice of the next action can depend on the past history and
can be probabilistic in nature, i.e., strategies provide a conditional probability
distribution over the actions that are available at the current stage, see any of
the following textbooks and monographs [18,10,19,17] for a formal deﬁnition.
Fixing the strategies σ of player 0 and τ of player 1 and an initial state s
yields a unique probability measure µs,σ,τ over the Borel sets of plays starting
at s. Now we can state more formally that the aim of player 0 is to choose, if
possible, a strategy maximizing his expected payment
Es,σ,τ (u) =
∫
u(p)µs,σ,τ(dp)
where the integral is taken over the set of all plays p starting at s (we assume
tacitly that u is integrable).
Varying the payment mapping u we obtain diﬀerent classes of stochastic
games.
5 Finiteness of the state space is not really necessary.
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We say that a game starting at s has a value for a payment map u if
sup
σ
inf
τ
Es,σ,τ (u) = inf
τ
sup
σ
Es,σ,τ (u),
where σ and τ range over all strategies of both players. The equation above
means that both players have ε-optimal strategies.
There are two simpler but important subclasses of stochastic games.
In perfect information stochastic games the set S of states is partitioned
onto the sets S0 and S1 of states of player 0 and player 1 respectively. For the
states of Si belonging to player i the set of actions available to his adversary
contains just one element. Such games allow a description simpler than that
of general stochastic games. We can assume that with each state s there is
associated a ﬁnite set A(s) of actions. When we are at the state s the owner
i of s (s ∈ Si) choses an action a ∈ A(s) to execute and the execution of a
leads to a new state s′ ∈ S with a ﬁxed probability p(s′ | s, a). Again we
assume that p(· | s, a, b) is a ﬁxed conditional probability distribution with∑
s′∈S p(s
′ | s, a) = 1 for all s and a ∈ A(s).
Yet even simpler class of games is composed of deterministic games. This
are perfect information games where for each state s and each action a ∈ A(s)
there is one state s′ such that p(s′ | s, a) = 1, i.e., the choice of a determines
unambiguously the next state.
2 Pieces of the Puzzle
Diﬀerent types of game models share the same framework described in the
previous section and diﬀer only by their payoﬀ mappings.
2.1 Mean-payoﬀ and Discounted Games
Let us suppose that for each transition (s, a, b) ∈ T we have a real number
r(s, a, b) — a one day payoﬀ.
In the mean payoﬀ games we look at the long run mean value of one day
payoﬀs. For a play p = (s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), (s2, a2, b2), . . . let r = (ri)
∞
i=0
be the sequence of corresponding one day rewards (ri = r(si, ai, bi)) and
σn(r) =
1
n+1
∑n
i=0 ri their mean value over the ﬁrst n + 1 days. Since the
limit limn→∞ σn(r) need not exist we consider either upper or lower limits:
lim sup
n→∞
σn(r) = lim
n→∞
sup
i≥n
σi(r) and lim inf
n→∞
σn(r) = lim
n→∞
inf
i≥n
σi(r)
and take one of them as the payment umean(p) corresponding to the play p.
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In discounted games we ﬁx a discount factor λ ∈ (0; 1) and the payoﬀ of
the play p = (s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), (s2, a2, b2), . . . is given by
uλ(p) = (1− λ)
∞∑
i=0
riλ
i, where ri = r(si, ai, bi). (1)
Shapley [16] showed that discounted games have values and that both
players have optimal positional strategies. Bewley and Kohlberg [1,2,3] showed
that the limit of the value of a discounted game exists as λ ↗ 1. Subsequently
Mertens and Neyman [12] proved that this limit gives in fact the value of the
mean payoﬀ stochastic game. The proofs of the results of Bewley, Kohlberg,
Mertens and Neyman are diﬃcult [10].
2.2 Parity Games and How to Discount Them
Let us recall that parity games were ﬁrst deﬁned in the framework of de-
terministic games in Emerson and Jutla [9] (and Mostowski[13]) with two
applications: the complementation problem for automata over inﬁnite trees
and modal µ-calculus.
Stochastic parity games were introduced and investigated in detail in a
series of paper by de Alfaro et al. [6,5,7]. The last of these papers proves, by
means of µ-calculus, that such games have a value. In stochastic parity games
the one day rewards, that are sometimes called colors in this setting, are non
negative integers, r(s, a, b) ∈ N, (s, a, b) ∈ T , and the payoﬀ of the play
p = (s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), (s2, a2, b2), . . . is given by
uparity(p) = (lim sup ri) mod 2, where ri = r(si, ai, bi).
Thus uparity(p) is either 0 or 1 depending on the parity of the maximal one day
payoﬀ visited inﬁnitely often 6 . Although there are many apparent similarities
between mean payoﬀ and parity games, especially in the deterministic case,
[4,15], the exact relation between these two types of games remained elusive.
In part at least this was due to the absence of appropriate discounted parity
games. In fact, one of the most striking features of mean payoﬀ games is the
possibility of approximating them by discounted games. Therefore it seems
that, unless we ﬁnd discounted counterpart for parity games, the analogies
between parity and mean payoﬀ games should be considered as superﬂuous.
6 Usually, one day payoﬀs or colors used in parity games are associated with states, i.e., it
is assumed that each state s ∈ S is colored by r(s) ∈ N. We prefer to color the “transitions”
in order to allow a more uniform setting for parity/mean payoﬀ/discounted games.
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It turns out, however, that discounted version of parity games has already
been discovered by de Alfaro, Henzinger and Majumdar [8]. More exactly, the
paper [8] deals mainly with discounted µ-calculus and the references to games
are cursory and concern only the simplest cases like reachability, safety and
Bu¨chi games. Probably this is the reason why the potential residing in this
approach was not fully exploited up to now. In fact it seems rather improbable
to unify mean payoﬀ and parity games through µ-calculus. Stochastic mean
payoﬀ games need much more sophisticated tools and their theory is related
to the theory of nonexpansive mappings [14], that, in general, may have no
ﬁxed points. Therefore game theory seems to oﬀer a broader perspective than
µ-calculus. The ﬁrst task is then to translate discounted µ-calculus to games,
i.e., to provide an appropriate payoﬀ mapping for inﬁnite plays. There is no
need to provide the corresponding formula immediately since we can realize
quickly that the payoﬀ mapping obtained by this translation is just a very
special case of the discounted payoﬀ considered originally by Shapley [16].
More precisely, Shapley [16] considered total payoﬀ stochastic games where
for each state s ∈ S there is a ﬁxed probability α(s) that the game stops when
visiting s. As it is well-known (and can be seen easily) the expected total
payoﬀ under the stopping condition is the same as the expected payoﬀ for
inﬁnite non stopping games where each passage though a state s results in
discounting all subsequent one day payoﬀs by the factor λ(s) = 1 − α(s).
Thus Shapley games can be seen as games where the payoﬀ of an inﬁnite play
p = (s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), (s2, a2, b2), . . . is given by
uShapley(p) =
∞∑
n=0
λ0 . . . λnrn, where ∀i ∈ N, λi = λ(si) and ri = r(si, ai, bi).
(2)
The idea of many diﬀerent discount factors was abandoned in all subsequent
papers and textbooks relating discounted games since it turned out essentially
useless and many discount factors add only unnecessary clutter. It is the
formula (1), with one discount factor, that is universally applied.
However, as observed in [8], many diﬀerent discount factors are essential
for discounting parity games. But the formula (2) is inappropriate when we
want to investigate the limit payment as various discount factors tend to 1.
To this end we should ﬁrst amend (2) and add to it supplementary factors of
the form (1− λi). This yields our ﬁnal multi-discount payment mapping.
Let λ be a mapping that for each transition (s, a, b) gives a discount factor
λ(s, a, b) ∈ (0; 1) (which can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent transitions) and let
r(s, a, b) ∈ R be, as previously, the corresponding one day reward. For a play
p = (s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), (s2, a2, b2), . . . we set ∀i ∈ N, λi = λ(si, ai, bi) and
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ri = r(si, ai, bi). Then multi-discount payoﬀ for p is given by
umulti(p) =
∞∑
n=0
(1− λn)λ0 · · ·λn−1rn. (3)
The discounted µ-calculus of de Alfaro et al.[8] corresponds in fact to the
payoﬀ (3) with the additional constraint:
(A) the one day rewards r(s, a, b) take only the values 0 and 1.
Yet another restriction appears in [8] when the limit of the multi-discount
payoﬀ is considered with various discount factors tending to 1. To explain it
precisely we should change ﬁrst the semantics of discounted factors. Instead
of supposing that λ maps the transitions to ﬁxed real numbers from the in-
terval (0; 1) we shall assume that there is a ﬁnite set Λ of discount variables
or parameters and that λ is a mapping from the set of transitions into the
set Λ of variables, with diﬀerent transitions that can be mapped to the same
variable. Then the multi-discount payment umulti(p) can be viewed as a func-
tion of the variables Λ and we can examine what happens if the variables of Λ
tend to 1. When investigating such limits [8] imposes an additional condition
restricting syntactically the occurrences of discount factors in µ-calculus for-
mulas. Roughly speaking, in the game framework this restriction translates
to the following condition:
(B) if two transitions are mapped to the same discount variable then the one
day rewards for these transitions are also equal, i.e.,
for all (s′, a′, b′), (s, a, b) ∈ T ,
if λ(s′, a′, b′) = λ(s, a, b) ∈ Λ then r(s′, a′, b′) = r(s, a, b).
It turns out, however, that the most interesting things happen precisely
when we relax either (A) or (B) or both these restrictions and examine (3)
when discount variables tend to 1 in some order. This leads in the limit to
several new games that generalize either parity or mean payoﬀ games or both
of them. This approach turns out to be very fruitful, we can proﬁt largely
from the accumulated knowledge concerning classical stochastic games [10] to
establish eﬀortlessly results about parity games and their extensions. On the
other hand, this method suggests also how to deﬁne “prioritized” versions of
classical stochastic games which can be of some interest for game theory. This
subject is developed extensively in [11].
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